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RECENT DECISIONS
This section is divided into two parts: notes and abstracts. The abstracts consist merely
of summaries of the facts and holdings of recent cases and are distinguished from the notes
by the absence of discussion.

NOTES
CHARITIES-WORDS NECESSARY TO CREATE A VALID TRUST FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES-Testatrix left a will in which she directed her executor,
after paying certain specific bequests, to give the residue of her estate "to some
worthy cause or institution." From a decree rejecting the contention of decedent's next of kin that this residuary gift was void for indefiniteness, the next
of kin appeal, arguing that the word "worthy" is not synonymous with "charitable," and that, in view of this, the bequest should fail for uncertainty, because
testatrix did not specify the particular institution which was to receive the benefit
of her bounty. Held, the bequest is valid. This court feels that the problem is
one of interpretation of the word "worthy" which can be solved by determining
what the word meant to the testatrix and the thought which she thereby attempted to convey. The court finds little difficulty in concluding that the word
as here used was meant to refer only to an institution which would fall within
the legal definition of a charity, a construction which is justified by the principle
that, if there be any doubt, a testator is presumed to intend the meaning which
makes his gift legally effective rather than one which renders it of no effect.
In re Funk's Estate, (Pa. 1946) 45 A. (2d) 67.
A similar problem of construction was raised in a recent English case,1
where a different result was reached. It might, therefore, be profitable to consider that case along with the principal case. The facts and holding in the case
were, briefly, as follows. 2 The testator left the residue of his estate in trust
"for such charitable institution or institutions or other charitable or benevolent
object or objects as his executors might in their absolute discretion: select." It
was contended by those who would take on an intestacy that this was not a good
charitable bequest by reason of the words "charitable or benevolent." The House
of Lords held that the words "or benevolent" prima facie indicated an alternative purpose, and as there was nothing in the will to justify a different interpretation, the gift was void for uncertainty. The co~rt was faced in this case, as in
the principal case, with the problem of determining whether the testator intended
that the property should be applied OIJ.ly to charitable purposes or whether his
intention was to give the trustees discretion to apply it to non-charitable-purposes.
The weight of authority is to the effect that if the purposes are limited to
charitable purposes the disposition is valid even though the trustees are given
complete discretion in the choice of charitable objects. 3 And it is frequently
1 Chichester Diocesan Fund and Bd. of Finance, Inc. v. Simpson, [1944] A.C.
341, [1944] 2 All Eng. Law Rep. Ann. 60.
2 An authoritative discussion of this case is given in A. W. Scott, "Trusts for
Charitable and Benevolent Purposes," 58 HARV. L. REv. 548 (1945).
3 Sco'IT ON TRUSTS, § 396 (Supp. 1944).
See Beggs v. United States,
(Ct. Cl. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 599; Comm. of Internal Revenue v. Upjohn's Estate,
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said that the courts look with favor on a trust for charitable purposes, and that
in the case of an ambiguity that construction will be adopted which will sustain
the validity of the gift. 4 This was the view taken in the principal case, but the
English judges in the Chichester case, while recognizing the existence of this
principle, apparently thought that there was nothing ambiguous in the bequest
which they had before them, 5 and thus did not let the principle influence their
decision. Certainly it would seem that the holding in the case of Funk's Estate
is more desirable than that in the Chichester case from the standpoint of the
attempt to give effect to the decedent's apparent intention, and it is submitted
that a bequest of this kind should never be held void for uncertainty unless there
is such doubt as to what the testator intended that his disposition could not be
tested by his intent.6 It is unfortunate that the English court gave such a broad
interpretation to the language of the testator when the only result of it was to
defeat his purposes. Surely it would have been a fair inference from the words
"charitable or benevolent" that the testator had reference to a charitable purpose.
It is very probable that the words so used were regarded by the testator as
synonymous, and if so regarded, the use of both was unnecessary.7 However,
it was pointed out by Lord Wright in the Chi.chester case that "such tautology
is not uncommon," 8 and this is certainly a plausible explanation of the usage.9
(C.C.A. 6th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 73; Moskowitz v. Federman, 72 Ohio App. 149,
51 N.E. (2d) 48 (1943).
4
In construing charitable bequests " ••. if there are two possible methods of
construction, one of which will render the gift valid and the other invalid, courts will
adopt the construction which will sustain the gift." Walker v. Central Trust & Savings
Bank of Geneseo, 318 Ill. 253 at 256, 149 N.E. 234 (1925). See also BoGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES,§ 369 (1935).
5
"If there is an ambiguity, it may be that I am at liberty to choose that construction which will give legal effect to the instrument rather than that which will invalidate
it.... I am not at liberty to create an ambiguity in order then to place what is sometimes called a benignant construction upon the will." Opinion of Lord Simonds, Chichester Diocesan Fund and Bd. of Finance, Inc. v. Simpson, [1944] A.C. 341, [1944]
2 All Eng. Rep. Ann. 60.
6
This is the view stated by Professor Scott in 58 HARV. L. REv. 548 at 565
(1945).
7
"In many particularly of the earlier cases trusts for 'benevolent' purposes have
been held invalid. Yet surely the testator ordinarily uses this term merely as a synonym
for the word 'charitable'..•• In the more recent decisions the courts nave generally
upheld as charitable trusts for benevolent purposes, construing the words as equivalent
to charitable purposes." ScoTroN TRUSTS,§ 398. 1 (1939). See Gossett v. Swinney,
(C.C.A. 8th, 1931) 53 F. (2d) 772, cert. den., 286 U.S. 545, 52 S. Ct. 497 (1932);
Chicago Bank of Commerce v. McPherson, (C.C.A. 6th, 1932) 62 F. (2d) 393, cert.
den., 289 U.S. 736, 53 S. Ct. 596 (1933).
8
"The testator in the present case is not likely to have thought of charitable
and benevolent as describing two different classes of objects. He would prima facie
mean a class of objects which could be indifferently described as charitable or benevolent, that is, one class having the same two-fold characteristics, if, indeed, he thought
of them as more than two epithets having the same meaning. Such tautology is not
uncommon." Dissent of Lord Wright in the Chichester case, [1944] A.C. 341 at
362, [1944] 2 All Eng. Rep. Ann. 60.
0
Professor Scott is in accord with this view where he points out that, "Laymen
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As Professor Scott has indicated, it is possible to find that the testator by his
language intended that any disposition which the trustee should make should be
for an object which is both charitable and benevolent, which would be a fair
answer to the court's finding that the word "benevolent" has a wider connotation than that of the word "charitable." 10 Some courts have gone further than
this and have upheld' a trust for benevolent purposes even though the word
"benevolent" was not held to be so limited in meaning as to be synonymous with
the word "charitable." 11 In the absence of statute, such a holding probably goes
beyond the point to which most courts would be willing to go.12 The difficulty
in cases of this kind is that such words as "worthy," "benevolent," "philanthropic," etc., do not have an established technical meaning in the law, and if
they are used in a will to characterize a class of beneficiaries broader than
charities, they may nullify that which the testator was trying to accomplish.18
However, as long as the court can reasonably find that the testator, despite the
use of such words, did intend a charitable gift, then his intention should be given
effect.

John S. Dobson, S.Ed.

as well as lawyers like to use two or three words where one would do, since the balanced
structure is thought to be artistic. The Bible and the works of Shakespeare, as well
as deeds and wills, are full of tautological expressions." 58 HARV. L. REv. 548 at 553
(1945).
10 Id. at 555.
11 Cochran v. McLaughlin, 128 Conn. 638, 24 A. (2d) 836 (1942); In re
Dulles' Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 A. 49 (1907).
12 For examples of such statutes see Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 26.1_191; N.Y.
Personal Prop. Law (McKinney, 1938) § 12, N.Y. Real Prop. Law (McKinney,
1945) § II3.
18 Principal case at 69.

